Port Metro Vancouver shakeup a victory for everyone
Railways, terminal operator gaining from collaboration at Deltaport
VANCOUVER -- The public rehabilitation of Port Metro Vancouver began in earnest on Oct. 29, 2010.
Claude Mongeau stood before the Vancouver Board of Trade, BlackBerry in hand, and announced that Canadian National Railway was fully on-board with a plan to turn Port Metro Vancouver into one of the world’s best-performing and most reliable movers of goods.
The BlackBerry was a symbol, the president and CEO explained, of his railway’s commitment to a new relationship among the port’s primary stakeholders — one in which CN, Canadian Pacific, the port authority and the cargo terminal operators would work in harmony to hasten the movement of containers through the port.
Mongeau said his mobile device gave him access to daily information about how this vital supply chain was performing — and that he was watching it intently.
For anyone who had been tracking the port authority’s turbulent efforts to deliver on the promise of maturing as Canada’s western ‘gateway,’ Mongeau’s enthusiasm for this enterprise was welcome but unexpected, considering recent history.
Port Metro Vancouver is Canada’s largest port, moving containers and other goods with an annual value of about $75 billion. More than 2.5 million containers arrived or departed here last year, carrying lumber, household goods, wood pulp, food, construction materials and other trade goods for markets in Asia, Eastern Canada, the U.S. and elsewhere.
But it is only since last year that the port has begun to take full advantage of the opportunity at its doorstep.
The Vancouver port is optimally located. A ship departing from China arrives in Vancouver two days faster than one travelling to Los Angeles. Rail links to Eastern Canada and even into Chicago are faster than L.A.’s.
Six years ago, that advantage meant nothing. Western Canada’s largest container port hit rock bottom in January 2005 with a public acknowledgment that it was in a state of “gridlock.”
It was taking two weeks to move a container through the port.
There were 5,000 containers stalled on the docks and a backlog of work that would take two months to clear. It was an international black eye.
There was no shortage of culprits — all of whom had been warned weeks earlier that a Chinese ‘cargo tsunami’ was approaching with the Jan. 1, 2005 cessation of World Trade Organization quotas on clothing and textile imports from China, India and 38 other nations.
The port authority looked like a stereotypical government agency: ineffectual.
The terminal operators looked overwhelmed, and blamed CN for failing to maintain a sufficient supply of rail cars to support the flow of goods onto and off the docks.
CN blamed the weather and other technical issues slowing its trains — but also pointed to what it described as “productivity issues” besetting terminal operators.
Some lessons were learned. |